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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
!• Does a trustee under a deed of trust satisfy its 
duty of care to the beneficiary when it executes and records a 
deed of reconveyance of the trust property in good faith 
reliance on an acknowledged request for reconveyance? 
2. Does a trustee under a deed of trust owe the 
beneficiary any duty to foresee that an acknowledged request 
for reconveyance of the trust property is a forgery? 
PERTINENT STATUTE 
Utah Code Ann, § 57-1-33 (1953) Satisfaction of obligation 
secured by trust deed—Reconveyance of trust property. 
When the obligation secured by any trust deed has been 
satisfied, the trustee shall, upon written request by the 
beneficiary, reconvey the trust property. The reconveyance may 
designate the grantee therein as "the person or persons 
entitled thereto." The beneficiary under such trust deed shall 
deliver to the trustor or his successor in interest the trust 
deed and the note or other evidence of the obligation so 
satisfied. Any beneficiary under such trust deed who refuses 
to request a reconveyance from the trustee for a period of 
thirty days after written demand therefor is made by the 
trustor or his successor in interest shall be liable to the 
trustor or his successor in interest, as the case may be, for 
double damages resulting from such refusal, or such trustor or 
his successor in interest may bring an action against the 
beneficiary and trustee to compel a reconveyance of the trust 
property and in such action the judgment of the court shall be 
that the trustee reconvey the trust property and that the 
beneficiary pay to the trustor, or his successor in interest, 
as the case may be, the costs of suit including a reasonable 
attorney's fee and all damages resulting from the refusal of 
the beneficiary to request a reconveyance as hereinabove 
provided. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The case is before this court on plaintiffs appeal 
from the trial court's summary judgment dismissing plaintiff's 
Complaint against Guardian Title Company of Utah and Warren H. 
Curlis. The Memorandum Decision granting the motion of 
Guardian and Curlis was signed by the Honorable David E. Roth 
on October 21, 1985. R. at 520-2. A copy of the Memorandum 
Decision is attached as Addendum I. The trial court's judgment 
was entered on March 17, 1986. R. at 589-90. 
This appeal has been consolidated with Case No. 
860156, another appeal from the same trial court proceeding. 
Case No. 860156 is an appeal by Randy Krantz, B. Brad 
Christenson, and Debra Christenson, from a judgment entered 
against them in favor of plaintiff on February 14, 1986. R. at 
554-5. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. On or about July 1, 1980, defendants Randy Krantz 
and B. Brad Christenson purchased from plaintiff a piece of 
real property located in Helper, Utah, R. at 384, 434-5. 
2. The sale of the property was financed in part by 
plaintiff. Defendants Randy Krantz, B. Brad Christensen, 
Debra S. Christenson and R & C Associates ("R & C") executed a 
promissory note in favor of plaintiff and her mother, Eva 
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Robertson, in the amount of $61,800, R. at 1, 384-5, 434. A 
copy of the promissory note is attached as Addendum II. 
3. To secure plaintiff's loan, R & C pledged certain 
real property it owned, located in Weber County, as 
collateral. R. at 385, 435. 
4. The lien created in favor of plaintiff is 
evidenced by a deed of trust naming R & C Associates as trustor 
and plaintiff and Eva Robertson as beneficiaries. R. at 385, 
435. A copy of the deed of trust is attached as Addendum III. 
5. Eva Robertson, who is plaintiffs mother, has 
assigned to plaintiff her interest in both the promissory note 
and the trust deed. R. at 385, 435. 
6. Guardian Title Company acted as trustee under the 
deed of trust. It played no other role in the transaction. R. 
at 385, 435. 
7. On or about December 18, 1980, Guardian, as 
trustee, received a written, acknowledged Request for Full 
Reconveyance of the property subject to the trust deed, 
apparently signed by plaintiff and Eva Robertson. R. at 385, 
436. A copy of the Request for Full Reconveyance is attached 
as Addendum IV. 
8. Upon receiving the acknowledged Request for 
Reconveyance, Guardian complied with the request by executing 
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and recording a Deed of Reconveyance of the property subject to 
the deed of trust. The Deed of Reconveyance was executed by 
Guardian's President, Warren H. Curlis. R. at 386, 436. A 
copy of the Deed of Reconveyance is attached as Addendum V. 
9. The Request for Full Reconveyance states that the 
debt secured by the deed of trust "has been fully paid and 
satisfied . . . ." R. at 404; Addendum IV. 
10. Guardian took no further steps to ascertain 
whether plaintiff, the beneficiary under the deed of trust, had 
been paid, prior to executing and recording the Deed of 
Reconveyance, other than to ascertain that the Request for Full 
Reconveyance was properly acknowledged. R. at 386, 436-7; 
Curlis Deposition, pp. 40, 42-3. 
11. Guardian acted in good faith in executing and 
recording the deed of reconveyance in reliance upon the 
acknowledged request for reconveyance. There is no claim or 
evidence whatsoever of any improper motive on Guardian's part 
in this case. R. at 386; Wycalis Deposition, p. 92. 
12. Plaintiff alleges that the request for 
reconveyance was a forgery and that neither she nor Eva 
Robertson signed it. R. at 386, 437; Wycalis Deposition, 
pp. 81-2. Guardian assumed, for purposes of its motion for 
summary judgment below, R. at 386, and assumes for purposes of 
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this appeal only, that the request for reconveyance was a 
forgery. 
13. Over the years Guardian has, in the capacity of 
trustee under deeds of trust, executed literally hundreds of 
deeds of reconveyance based on written requests for 
reconveyance. Except for the instance alleged in this lawsuit, 
Guardian knows of no other request for reconveyance submitted 
to it that has been forged. R. at 386-7, 399-40. 
14. When the deed of reconveyance was recorded by 
Guardian, plaintiff lost the benefit of the real property 
collateral securing her loan to defendants Krantz and the 
Christensons. R. at 387, 436. 
15. After the deed of reconveyance was recorded, a 
process virtually identical to that described above occurred 
again: plaintiff became the beneficiary under another deed of 
trust, describing a different piece of property, under which 
Guardian was also the trustee. After this deed of trust had 
been recorded, Guardian received another acknowledged request 
for reconveyance of the property subject to this trust deed, 
which also had apparently been signed by plaintiff and Eva 
Robertson. Guardian accordingly executed and recorded a deed 
of reconveyance of this property, as it had done in response to 
the first acknowledged request. R. at 437-8. However, 
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plaintiff claims she had no knowledge of events relating to the 
later trust deed. R. at 438. Further, plaintiff "does not 
have, nor does she claim, any interest in the substituted 
security." Appellant's Brief, p. 9. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
This appeal arises from plaintiffs suit to collect on 
a promissory note. In the court below, plaintiff obtained 
judgment against three of the co-makers of the note, Randy 
Krantz, B. Brad Christenson, and Debra S. Christensen. Those 
defendants have appealed that judgment to this court in Case 
No. 860156, which has been consolidated with this appeal. 
The promissory note was secured by real property 
described in a deed of trust, under which plaintiff was the 
beneficiary. Guardian Title Company, respondent herein, was 
the trustee under the deed of trust. 
Several months after the deed of trust had been 
recorded, Guardian received a written, acknowledged request for 
reconveyance of the trust property. Upon receiving the 
request, Guardian performed its statutory duty by executing and 
recording a deed of reconveyance of the property. Plaintiff 
claims that the request for reconveyance which Guardian acted 
upon was a forgery. Nonetheless, as a result of the 
recordation of the deed of reconveyance, plaintiff lost her 
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lien against the real property collateral. Plaintiff brought 
suit against Guardian, claiming it had acted negligently in 
reconveying the trust property, and should therefore be held 
liable to her for the amount due on the promissory note. 
In the court below, Guardian sought and was granted 
summary judgment dismissing it from the case. Its arguments on 
this appeal, to support affirmance of the trial court's 
judgment, are the same arguments it presented in support of its 
motion below. 
On her appeal, plaintiff significantly does not 
contend that the case should be remanded for the trial of 
material issues of fact. Instead, she contends that the trial 
court's judgment should be reversed, that is, that Guardian 
should be held liable to her as a matter of law. 
Plaintiff has wholly failed to show her entitlement to 
such extradordinary relief. First of all, Guardian owed no 
legal duty to protect plaintiff from the consequences of a 
deliberate criminal act - a forgery, as she alleges - which 
resulted in reconveyance of the trust property. Second, even 
assuming such a legal duty was owed, Guardian satisfied that 
duty as a matter of law by acting, as the trial court held, in 
good faith reliance upon a request for reconveyance 
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of the trust property which had been properly acknowledged 
under Utah law. 
In support of her position on appeal, plaintiff 
reiterates many of the arguments she advanced below. In 
addition, she sets forth numerous arguments that were not 
presented to the trial court. These arguments should not be 
considered by this court for the first time on appeal. 
Plaintiff's request for reversal of the judgment below 
in this case is extraordinary because, as we will demonstrate, 
she points to no evidence in the record to demonstrate that 
Guardian, by acting as it did, failed to satisfy its duty to 
plaintiff. Furthermore, her Brief contains no legal authority 
whatsoever holding that Guardian, by reconveying based on an 
acknowledged request for reconveyance, failed to satisfy the 
duties of a trustee. 
As demonstrated below, the trial court's judgment was 
clearly correct, and should be affirmed. 
ARGUMENT 
I. INTRODUCTION TO ARGUMENT. 
A* What This Case Is About. 
This case involves the familiar device used in the 
State of Utah to secure obligations with real property—the 
deed of trust. The trust deed security mechanism is created by 
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Utah Code Ann, §§ 57-1-19 to 36 (1953), which authorizes a 
three-party arrangement involving a trustor, a beneficiary, and 
a trustee. Under this arrangement, the trustor executes a deed 
of trust in favor of the trustee, who then holds the property 
in trust for the beneficiary, who ordinarily has extended 
credit to the trustor. The effect of this arrangement is for 
the trustor to convey his real property as security for the 
debt owed to the beneficiary. 
In the event the debt secured by the trust property is 
not paid, the trustee is empowered to sell the property to 
satisfy the debt. Saa Utah Code Ann. §§ 57-1-23 to 32 (1953). 
If, on the other hand, the debt secured by the deed of 
trust is paid, the trustee, upon written request from the 
beneficiary, must "reconvey" the trust property to the 
trustor. Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-33 (1953). Recordation of a 
deed of reconveyance executed by the trustee extinguishes the 
beneficiary* s lien. 
This case specifically involves the mechanism for 
effecting a reconveyance of property subject to a trust deed, 
and raises the issue whether a trustee under a deed of trust 
may rely, with impunity, on an acknowledged request for 
reconveyance in executing and recording a deed of reconveyance 
of the trust property. 
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The operative facts are straight-forward and are not 
in dispute. Defendant Guardian was named as trustee under a 
deed of trust. Plaintiff was the beneficiary. Several months 
after the trust deed was recorded. Guardian received a request 
for reconveyance, appearing to carry the signature of the 
beneficiaries: plaintiff, and her mother, Eva Robertson. 
The request for reconveyance had been properly acknowledged in 
accordance with Utah law. See Addendum IV; Utah Code Ann. 
§§ 57-2-1 et sea. (1953). 
In reliance on the acknowledged request, Guardian, 
through its President Warren H. Curlis, who is also a 
defendant, executed and recorded a deed of reconveyance. 
(Guardian and Curlis are referred to hereafter collectively as 
"Guardian.") Guardian relied exclusively on the acknowledged 
request, which states that the debt owed plaintiff "has been 
fully paid and satisfied," in acting as it did. It took no 
further steps to ascertain whether plaintiff had been paid. 
The effect of Guardian's conduct was to divest plaintiff of her 
lien against the property. 
1
 Although Eva Robertson was one of the 
beneficiaries under the deed of trust, she has assigned her 
interest in the trust deed to plaintiff. 
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Several months later, when the co-makers of 
2 
plaintiffs promissory note defaulted, plaintiff claims she 
first learned that the trust property had been reconveyed. She 
claims she never signed the request for reconveyance, does not 
3 know who did, and that it is a forgery. 
Thereafter, plaintiff brought this suit against 
Guardian, claiming it acted negligently in reconveying the 
trust property and was therefore liable for the amount of 
plaintiff's debt. 
B. The Ruling Below. 
After completing its discovery, Guardian moved for 
summary judgment, arguing: 
1. Assuming the request for reconveyance was a 
forgery, Guardian nonetheless owed no legal duty to protect 
plaintiff from this unforeseeable criminal act; and 
2. Guardian was entitled, as a matter of law, 
to rely on the acknowledged request for reconveyance as a basis 
for reconveying the trust property. 
2
 The co-makers are defendants Randy Krantz, B. 
Brad Christenson and Debra Christenson. The trial court held 
them liable to plaintiff on the promissory note. They have 
appealed to this court in Case No. 860156, which is 
consolidated with this appeal. 
3
 Guardian assumed for purposes of its motion for 
summary judgment below, and also must assume for purposes of 
this appeal, that the request was in fact a forgery. 
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These arguments are set forth in detail below. 
To oppose Guardian's motion, plaintiff did not attempt 
to show the existence of a factual issue which precluded 
granting summary judgment. Plaintiff conceded that no material 
issues of fact were in dispute. R. at 433-9; 471-2; 520. 
Instead, plaintiff responded by arguing, in substance, 
that because the request for reconveyance was, in her view, 
"unauthorized", see R. at 442-4, Guardian should be held liable 
to plaintiff as a matter of law. In effect, plaintiff's 
position below was that, based on the undisputed facts, 
plaintiff was entitled to judgment against Guardian. 
Guardian's motion was decided without oral argument, 
4 
based on the memoranda submitted. After reviewing the 
parties' arguments, the court ruled as follows: 
The Court finds that Utah cases and 
Rules of Evidence, which give great weight 
to acknowledged documents, compel a ruling 
that, in a case such as this, a trustee is 
not negligent in relying on an acknowledged 
request to reconvey property unless the 
trustee has reason to believe the request is 
forged. No evidence has been presented to 
4
 The memoranda submitted on Guardian's motion, 
which contain all the arguments made below on the issues now 
before this court, are contained in the Record as follows: 
Guardian's Initial Memorandum, R. at 381-405; Plaintiff's 
Responsive Memorandum, R. at 433-47; Guardian's Reply 
Memorandum, R. at 471-5. 
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suggest that the trustee should have been 
suspicious of the document; therefore, 
defendant's motion for summary judgment is 
granted. 
R. at 521-2; Addendum I, pp. 2-3. 
C. Plaintiff's Position on Appeal. 
On this appeal, plaintiff does not contend that a 
material issue of fact exists to preclude the summary judgment 
appealed from. Of course, plaintiff could not take this 
position now, since she failed to make this argument below. 
Bundv v. Century Equipment Company, Inc., 692 P.2d 754, 758 
(Utah 1984); Franklin Financial v. New Empire Development Co., 
659 P.2d 1040, 1045 (Utah 1983). 
Instead, plaintiff argues that, based on the record 
before this court, the judgment below should be reversed—that 
Guardian should be held liable to plaintiff as a matter of 
law. Therefore, this is not the more routine case where the 
appellant claims summary judgment was improvidently granted, 
and the case should be remanded for the trial of factual issues. 
In support of her appeal to this court to reverse the 
judgment below, plaintiff advances essentially two arguments: 
1. Guardian failed to "know" that the promissory 
note had been paid before executing the deed of reconveyance; 
and 
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2. Guardian failed to require presentation of the 
original note and trust deed before recording the deed of 
reconveyance. These arguments are addressed in detail at 
Points IIIA and IIIB below. 
Reduced to simplest terms, plaintiff's position on 
this appeal is that, although Guardian acted in complete good 
faith, and had no reason to suspect a forgery, and although it 
relied on an acknowledged request for reconveyance, Guardian 
should be held liable to plaintiff as a matter of law. 
Incredibly, plaintiff takes this position despite the fact that: 
1. The record is devoid of any evidence to support 
any obligation on Guardian's part to satisfy any greater 
requirements than it did; and 
2. Plaintiff cites no legal authority whatsoever 
holding that Guardian, by relying on an acknowledged request 
for reconveyance, failed to satisfy the duties of a trustee. 
As set forth in greater detail below, the trial court 
properly granted Guardian's motion for summary judgment, and 
its judgment should therefore be affirmed. 
II. GUARDIAN SATISFIED ITS DUTY TO PLAINTIFF BY EXECUTING 
AND RECORDING THE DEED OF RECONVEYANCE IN GOOD FAITH 
RELIANCE ON AN ACKNOWLEDGED REQUEST FOR RECONVEYANCE. 
The operative statute, Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-33 
(1953), imposes only the following requirement on a trustee 
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asked to reconvey trust property: 
When the obligation secured by any 
trust deed has been satisfied, the trustee 
shall, upon written request by the 
beneficiary, reconvey the trust property. 
Although the statute only requires that the request be in 
writing, Guardian requires, as a matter of company policy, that 
such requests must in addition be properly acknowledged in 
accordance with Utah law. R. at 397; Curlis Deposition, 
p. 40. That policy was followed in this case. Thus, Guardian 
exceeded the requirements imposed by the statute. The trial 
court found that, in acting as it did, Guardian satisfied its 
duty to plaintiff as a matter of law, holding that "a trustee 
is not negligent in relying on an acknowledged request to 
reconvey property unless the trustee has reason to believe the 
request is forged." R. at 521; Addendum I, p.2. 
The trial court's holding is clearly correct. The 
purpose of an acknowledgement is to place a stamp of 
authenticity on a document so that parties may thereafter, 
without further inquiry, reasonably rely on the document's 
genuineness. In granting Guardian's motion for summary 
judgment, the trial court properly recognized that because the 
request for reconveyance was properly acknowledged, Guardian 
-15-
was entitled to presume the document was authentic, and to act 
accordingly. 
Utah law declares in many places the reliability that, 
as a matter of law, may be presumed from the acknowledgement of 
a document. For example, in Northcrest, Inc., v. Walker Bank & 
Trust Co., 248 P.2d 692, 694 (Utah 1952), the Supreme Court 
held that the acknowledgement of a document creates a strong 
presumption of its genuineness: 
This presumption should not be regarded 
lightly, but should be given great weight. 
The authorities generally hold that the 
effect of such certificate of acknowledgment 
will not be overthrown by a mere 
preponderance of the evidence, but it must 
be clear and convincing. 
Accord Webbe v. McGhie Land Title Co., 549 F.2d 1358, 1360 
(10th Cir. 1977); Gold Oil Land Development Corp. v. Davis, 611 
P.2d 711, 712 (Utah 1980); State ex rel. First Trust & Savings 
Bank v. Easlev, 140 S.W.2d 149, 151 (Tenn. 1940) ("A 
certificate of acknowledgement is an act which must in the 
nature of things be relied on with confidence by men of 
business."). State ex rel. Kansas City Title & Trust Co. v. 
Otto, 276 S.W. 96, 100 (Mo. Ct. App. 1925) ("It is well settled 
that one is entitled to rely upon a notary certificate and is 
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not required to doubt the truth of the certificate and go out 
and verify its statement."); 
Acknowledged documents not only carry a heavy 
presumption of genuineness, they are also self-authenticating 
under the Utah Rules of Evidence. That is, under Rule 902(8) 
of the Utah Rules of Evidence, an acknowledged document is, 
without any further proof, what it purports to be. The Notes 
of the Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Evidence, 
from which the new Utah Rules were taken, state that 
acknowledged documents, as well as other documents set out in 
Rule 902, are admissible without foundational testimony as to 
their authenticity "because practical considerations reduce the 
possibility of unauthenticity to a very small dimension." Fed. 
R. Evid. 902 advisory committee notes. The Notes further 
state, with specific reference to acknowledged documents, that 
"[i]f this authentication suffices for documents of the 
importance of those affecting titles, logic scarcely permits 
denying this method when other kinds of documents are 
involved." Fed. R. Evid. 902(8) advisory committee notes. 
Finally, and significantly, acknowledgement of any 
document affecting real estate entitles it to be recorded: 
A certificate of the acknowledgement of 
any conveyance, or of the proof of the 
execution thereof as provided in this title, 
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signed and certified by the officer taking 
the same as provided in this title, shall 
entitle such conveyance, with the 
certificate or certificates aforesaid, to be 
recorded in the office of the recorder of 
the county in which the real estate is 
situated. 
Utah Code Ann. § 57-3-1 (1953). In short, under Utah law the 
acknowledgement of a document constitutes the indicia of 
authenticity that the county recorder is entitled to rely on 
before recording a document. 
The above authorities demonstrate the great weight 
accorded to acknowledged documents under Utah law. They carry 
a presumption of reliability that can be overcome only by clear 
and convincing evidence; they may be relied on by judges and 
juries as presumptively authentic; and finally, the county 
recorder may rely on their genuineness. Furthermore, people 
throughout the real estate industry in this state do and must 
rely on the presumptive authenticity of acknowledged documents 
for that system to function effectively. R. at 393. 
Certainly this does not mean that acknowledged 
documents are infallible. There is always some possibility 
that someone, with the cooperation of an unscrupulous notary 
public, will forge a document and then have it acknowledged. 
The system is not fool-proof. 
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However, Guardian submits that, like a judge admitting 
evidence or the county recorder recording a document, it was 
entitled as a matter of law to rely on the genuineness of the 
request for reconveyance submitted to it. Indeed, it is 
evident that the very purpose of acknowledgements is to permit 
parties, such as Guardian, to presume the authenticity of 
acknowledged documents without further inquiry into or evidence 
of their genuineness. If Guardian and others like it could not 
so rely, the salutary purposes advanced by the acknowledgement 
of documents would be completely undermined: acknowledgements 
would be rendered meaningless. Guardian submits it acted 
reasonably in presuming the request was genuine, and fully 
satisfied its obligation as a trustee by complying with the 
acknowledged request. 
III. PLAINTIFF WHOLLY FAILS TO SHOW WHY GUARDIAN SHOULD BE 
HELD LIABLE AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
In her Appellant's Brief, plaintiff proffers 
essentially two arguments why, although Guardian acted in good 
faith reliance on an acknowledged document, it should 
nonetheless be held liable to her as a matter of law. First, 
plaintiff asserts that Guardian could not properly reconvey the 
trust property unless it "knew" that plaintiff's debt had been 
paid. See Appellant's Brief, pp. 10, 12, 14, 15 and 19. 
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Second, plaintiff argues, for the first time on this appeal, 
that Guardian should be held liable because it failed to 
require surrender of the note and trust deed prior to 
reconveying the property. See Appellant's Brief, pp. 16, 22. 
These arguments are addressed in sequence below. 
A, Guardian Completely Satisfied its Duty to "Know" 
that Plaintiff's Debt had Been Paid. 
Although Plaintiff states repeatedly that Guardian 
could not properly reconvey the trust property without first 
"knowing" that plaintiff's debt had first been paid, her Brief 
is devoid of any analysis of what Guardian, or any other 
trustee, should do to acquire this knowledge. Plaintiff 
apparently believes that, in order to avoid liability, the 
trustee must "know" with absolute certainty that the 
beneficiary's debt has been paid, and if it fails to "know" 
this fact, should be held strictly liable to the beneficiary. 
To the contrary, however, it is evident that Guardian's legal 
duty to "know" the debt has been paid is not absolute, but must 
instead be measured by some reasonable standard of care. 
There is a wide range of possible steps that Guardian, 
or any other trustee, might take to satisfy itself that a 
beneficiary's debt has been paid. At one extreme, Guardian 
might require every beneficiary to make an appointment to come 
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into its office, present unquestionable identification, and 
state under oath that the debt had been paid. Such a procedure 
would obviously impose an incredible administrative burden upon 
Guardian and other trustees. Numerous beneficiaries, having 
purchased mortgage paper on the secondary market, would be 
required to come in from out-of-town; an inordinate amount of 
time and effort would have to be invested in the reconveyance 
process. Not only would such a procedure be highly 
impractical, it significantly would not in any sense ensure 
that the debt had been paid. Imposter beneficiaries might come 
in to make this oath; true beneficiaries might, for whatever 
reason, lie under oath. 
At the other end of the spectrum, the trustee might 
require only a telephone call in which the caller identifies 
himself as the beneficiary, states that the debt had been paid, 
and a deed of reconveyance may be executed. This option would 
provide insufficient protection to the beneficiary's interest. 
Between the two extremes outlined, there are 
incremental gradations of care the trustee might exercise to 
reasonably protect the beneficiary's interest. 
What should the trustee be required to do to satisfy 
itself that the debt has been paid? As stated above, the 
statute only requires that the trustee receive a "written 
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request" for reconveyance. Arguably, such a written request is 
all that is required, but that issue is not before the court, 
because in this case the request for reconveyance was 
acknowledged. That acknowledged request carries a presumption 
of validity that "should be given great weight," Northcrest, 
Inc. v. Walker Bank & Trust Co., 248 P.2d 692, 694 (Utah 1952) 
and states on its face that the "indebtedness secured by said 
Trust Deed has been fully paid and satisfied . . . ." See 
Point II, supra. Guardian was entitled to rely on this 
statement in an acknowledged document, and by virtue of the 
request for reconveyance did everything that reasonably ought 
to be required to satisfy itself the debt had been paid. 
1. The Introductory Clause of § 57-1-33 Imposes 
No Duties on a Trustee. 
Plaintiff argues that the introductory clause in the 
statute, "[w]hen the obligation secured by any trust deed has 
been satisfied," somehow imposes on the trustee a duty to 
ensure that the debt has been paid. Appellant's Brief, p. 12. 
This language was not designed to make the trustee an insurer 
against non-payment of the debt, however. If the legislature 
intended to impose such an onerous obligation on the trustee, 
it certainly could have done so. 
It is evident that, rather than imposing any duties 
upon the trustee, this language merely describes the sequence 
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of events prior to a reconveyance: After the debt has been 
paid, and the trustee receives a written request for 
reconveyance, then the trustee must reconvey the trust property. 
2. Plaintiff Cites Neither Evidence Nor Case 
Law to Show that Guardian Failed to Satisfy 
Its Duty to Plaintiff, 
Although plaintiff urges emphatically that the trustee 
must "know" the debt has been paid before reconveying, she 
presents no evidence whatsoever to support this position. 
Beyond plaintiffs naked assertions, there simply is no 
evidence in the record that a trustee is required to do 
anything beyond what Guardian did in this case to satisfy 
itself that the debt is paid. 
Likewise, plaintiff sets forth no legal authority 
holding that the requirements of a trustee are any greater than 
those met by Guardian. Instead, plaintiff has cited several 
cases dealing in a very general way with the fiduciary 
obligations of a trustee, which Guardian does not dispute. In 
addition, she has cited several cases in which trustees have 
been held liable for improperly reconveying trust property. 
However, in every one of those cases the reconveyance at issue 
was entirely unauthorized—there simply had been no request for 
reconveyance 
-23-
at all, and the trustee acted in willful disregard of the 
rights of the beneficiary. 
For example, in Doyle v. Surety Title & Guaranty Co., 
68 Cal. Rptr. 177 (Cal. Ct. App. 1968), one of the chief cases 
relied upon by plaintiff, the trustee reconveyed based on a 
request for reconveyance made by the trustor. The beneficiary 
had made no request at all. 68 Cal. Rptr. at 179. Similarly, 
in Jeanese, Inc. v. Surety Title & Guaranty Company, 1 Cal. 
Rptr. 752 (Cal. Ct. App. 1960), the trustee had reconveyed by 
mistake, with no request for reconveyance. In Huffman v. 
Gould, 64 N.E.2d 773 (111. App. Ct. 1945), the trustee, 
described by the court as "a cheat, a rascal, and a base 
scoundrel bent upon defrauding the unsuspecting," 64 N.E.2d at 
777, released the trust deed maliciously, with deliberate 
disregard for the beneficiary's rights. 
These, and the rest of the cases cited by plaintiff, 
are obviously a far cry from this one, where Guardian 
reconveyed in complete good faith, based on an acknowledged 
request for reconveyance. None of plaintiff's legal 
authorities even come close to dealing with the issue before 
this court. 
In short, plaintiff has pointed to no authority, 
either evidentiary or legal, to support her position that 
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Guardian was required to do any more than it did in order to 
"know" that plaintiffs debt had been paid, 
B. Guardian Had No Obligation to Require Surrender 
of the Note and Trust Deed Before Reconvevinq the 
Trust Property, 
Plaintiff's second principal argument on appeal is 
that Guardian was obligated, before it could properly reconvey, 
to require the beneficiary to surrender to it the original note 
and trust deed. 
1. This Argument Should Not Be Considered on 
Appeal Because Plaintiff Failed to Raise It 
Below. 
Plaintiff failed to raise this argument in the trial 
court. Although she does mention this point in her Memorandum, 
5 in a one-sentence reference, she nowhere discusses what 
pertinence it may have. The trial court lists plaintiff's 
arguments in its Memorandum Decision, R. at 520-1; Addendum I, 
pp. 1 and 2, but does not list this as one of the points she 
has argued. Plaintiff's mere mention of this fact in passing, 
without arguing its significance to the trial court, is 
inadequate to raise the issue before the court below. 
Therefore, this argument should not be considered for the first 
5
 Out of the blue, plaintiff states at page 12 of 
her Memorandum below: "Nor did defendant require delivery of 
the original notes and trust deed . . . ." R. at 444. 
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time on this appeal. Bundy v. Century Equipment Company, Inc.; 
692 P.2d 754, 758 (Utah 1984); Franklin Financial v. New Empire 
Development Co.. 659 P.2d 1040, 1045 (Utah 1983). 
2. Plaintiff Again Cites No Evidence Or Case 
Law to Show Guardian Should Have Required 
Surrender of the Original Note and Trust 
Deed. 
Even assuming this argument was properly raised to the 
trial court, however, plaintiff again has pointed to no 
evidence in the record that surrender of the note and trust 
deed to the trustee is required. The only conceivable evidence 
of this point is contained in the Request itself, which reads, 
in pertinent part: 
Said Note, together with all other 
indebtedness secured by said Trust Deed has 
been fully paid and satisfied and you are 
hereby requested and directed, on payment to 
you of any sums owing to you under the terms 
of said Trust Deed, to cancel said Note 
above mentioned and all other evidences of 
indebtedness secured by said Trust Deed 
delivered to vou herewith, together with the 
said Trust Deed and to reconvey, without 
warranty to the parties designated by the 
terms of said Trust Deed, all the estate now 
held by you thereunder in and to the 
property described as follows: . . . . 
See Addendum IV (emphasis added). 
Relying on the emphasized language above, plaintiff 
argues that Guardian was required to obtain the note and trust 
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deed before reconveying. The language of this Request, 
however, imposes no legal obligations on Guardian. It is 
simply a pre-printed form, and nothing more. Moreover, the 
origin of this form is completely unknown based on the record 
before this court. There is no evidence, for example, that it 
is a form customarily used by Guardian. This document, which 
is not a form prescribed by statute, has no force of law. It 
is completely ineffective to impose any legal duties on 
Guardian. 
Furthermore, the language of the Request does not 
require surrender of the note and trust deed. Rather, it 
merely tells the trustee that, if those documents have been 
delivered, the property should be reconveyed. The Request by 
its terms does not make their surrender a condition to 
reconveyance. 
Finally, even if the Request could be read as imposing 
a requirement to tender the note and trust deed prior to 
reconveyance, such a requirement would in all events run 
contrary to the requirement of Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-33, 
(1953). That statute requires plainly that M[t]he beneficiary 
under such trust deed shall deliver to the trustor or his 
successor in interest the trust deed and the note or other 
evidence of the obligation so satisfied." (emphasis added). To 
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the extent this form purports to alter the unambiguous 
requirements of Utah Law, it clearly can impose no obligations 
on the Trustee. 
Plainly, the form Request constitutes no evidence that 
Guardian was required to obtain surrender of the note and trust 
deed before reconveying. Yet it is the only such evidence 
plaintiff has been able to point to. 
Likewise, plaintiff has again cited no case law for 
this proposition* She offers no support whatever, evidentiary 
or legal, for this argument. 
IV. GUARDIAN MAY NOT BE HELD LIABLE TO PLAINTIFF BECAUSE 
HER INJURY RESULTED FROM A DELIBERATE CRIMINAL ACT 
WHICH GUARDIAN, AS A MATTER OF LAW, HAD NO DUTY TO 
FORESEE. 
A. The Reconveyance Resulted From A Forgery 
Perpetrated By An Unidentified Third Party. 
Plaintiff alleges that the request for reconveyance, 
apparently bearing the signature of herself and her mother, was 
a forgery. When Guardian received the allegedly forged 
request, which had been properly acknowledged, Guardian 
prepared and recorded a deed of reconveyance. 
There is absolutely no claim or evidence in this case 
that Guardian, by recording the deed of reconveyance, acted in 
anything but the utmost good faith. Guardian assumed that the 
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acknowledged document was authentic. Unfortunately, at least 
according to plaintiff, it was instead a forgery. Forgery is a 
serious crime under Utah law. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501 
(1953). 
B. There Is No Duty to Foresee Criminal Acts. 
It is fundamental that one of the principal yardsticks 
to measure a party's duty to another is the foreseeability to 
the defendant of the particular risk the plaintiff is exposed 
to. Palsoraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 100 (N.Y. 
1928); Black v. Nelson, 532 P.2d 212, 213 (Utah 1975); Prosser 
and Keeton on Torts, § 43 (5th ed. 1984). 
It is also hornbook law that one has no duty to 
foresee the criminal misconduct of third parties. This is the 
law in Utah. In Gray v. Scott, 565 P.2d 76 (Utah 1977), the 
plaintiff in a wrongful death action appealed from a jury 
verdict in favor of defendant. In this case, the decedent had 
been a guest at a New Year's Eve party at the defendant Beehive 
Elks Lodge. During the party, he got into a fight with another 
guest, Scott, at which point the lodge manager intervened and 
the parties departed. After both parties had left, the manager 
was told there had been a shooting outside in the alley. 
Neither the manager nor anyone else made any investigation. 
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( 
Later, both the decedent and Scott returned to the party, and 
Scott shot and killed the decedent. 
Plaintiff brought suit against Scott as well as the 
lodge, asserting that the lodge, after it became aware of a 
scuffle between the decedent and Scott and a shooting incident 
in the alley, owed a legal duty to the decedent to take steps 
to prevent the fatal shooting from occurring. 
After a jury verdict was rendered in favor of the 
defendant lodge, plaintiff appealed, arguing that the trial 
court had erred in giving the following instruction: 
You are instructed that a private lodge or 
association, as well as its officers, has no 
duty to anyone to anticipate that a crime 
will be committed bv another person, and to 
act upon that belief. 
Id. at 77 (emphasis added). 
The Supreme Court rejected plaintiff's argument. Even 
though the lodge manager was aware of a shooting incident in 
the alley, and thus the imminent risk of serious injury to 
those at the party, the Court held that the foregoing 
instruction properly stated Utah law: H[I]t was not error to 
instruct that defendants had no duty to anticipate the 
commission of the subject crime." Id. at 78 (emphasis added). 
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This Court has recently affirmed the principles set 
forth in Gray v. Scott, in Williams v. Melbv, 699 P.2d 723, 
788-9 (Utah 1985), and Godeskv v. Provo Citv Corp., 690 P.2d 
541, 545 (Utah 1984), where it held that one is not liable for 
the unforseeable negligence of others- Whether another party's 
negligence is foreseeable is generally a question of fact. 
Harris v. Utah Transit Authority, 671 P.2d 217, 221-2 (Utah 
1983). Gray v. Scott is consistent with these cases, standing 
for the proposition that criminal conduct of another is 
unforeseeable as a matter of law. 
The rule of Gray v. Scott is consistent with the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 448 (1965), which provides as 
follows: 
The act of a third person in committing an 
intentional tort or crime is a superseding 
cause6 of harm to another resulting 
6
 It should be noted at this point that the legal 
authorities who have discussed the intervention of criminal 
acts view them differently in terms of tort analysis. The 
Restatement, and many courts, view an intentional tort or crime 
as a "superseding cause" that breaks the chain of causation. 
See, e.g., Gillot, infra p. 32, 507 F. Supp. at 457; Citizens 
State Bank, infra p. 32, 609 P.2d at 676-7. Others reason that 
one simply has no duty to foresee criminal conduct. See, e.g., 
Gray v. Scott, 565 P.2d 76, 77 (Utah 1977); Chavez, infra p. 
32, 595 P.2d at 1022-03. It would appear that in this case, 
analysis will be facilitated by addressing the issue in terms 
of duty, not under the rubric of proximate cause. See 
(Footnote 6 continued) 
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therefrom, although the actor's negligent 
conduct created a situation which afforded 
an opportunity to the third person to commit 
such a tort or crime, unless the actor at 
the time of his negligent conduct realized 
or should have realized the likelihood that 
such a situation might be created, and that 
a third person might avail himself of the 
opportunity to commit such a tort or crime. 
Numerous decisions in other jurisdictions apply this 
rule, holding as a matter of law that one owes no duty to 
anticipate the intentionally tortious or criminal acts of a 
third party. See, e,g,> Gillot v. Washington Metropolitan Area 
Transit Authority, 507 F. Supp. 454, 457 (D.D.C. 1981); 
Citizens State Bank v. Martin, 609 P.2d 670, 676-7 (Kansas 
1980); Chavez v. Tolleson Elementary School District, 595 P.2d 
1017, 1022-3 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1979). 
C. Guardian Owed No Legal Duty To Protect Plaintiff 
From The Forgery. 
The rule declared in Gray v. Scott easily disposes of 
the issue before the Court. In Gray, the defendant lodge 
manager was on notice of a specific and grave risk of harm to 
(Footnote 6 continued) 
generally, Little v. Utah State Division of Family Services, 
667 P.2d 49, 53 (Utah 1983); Prosser and Keeton on Torts, § 43 
(5th ed. 1984); Thode, Tort Analysis: Duty-Risk v. Proximate 
Cause and the Rational Allocation of Functions Between Judge 
and Jury, 1977 Utah L. Rev. 1. 
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plaintiff and other guests. There had been a shooting right 
outside his party. One might, in such a situation, reasonably 
foresee a shooting inside the party. Yet the Court there held 
that defendant owed no duty to anticipate and protect plaintiff 
from the defendant's criminal act. 
The record in this case, quite to the contrary, 
indicates that Guardian had no notice whatsoever of any risk 
that plaintiff might be victimized by a criminal act. Instead, 
in reliance on a properly acknowledged request for 
reconveyance, Guardian performed the duties imposed on it by 
the Utah Code and reconveyed the trust property. It never had 
any reason to believe or suspect that the request was not 
authentic. 
The forgery was simply unforeseeable as a matter of 
law. As Mr. Curlis* affidavit shows, Guardian has executed 
literally hundreds of deeds of reconveyance based on written 
requests for reconveyance. On no other occasion has there ever 
been a forged request. R. at 399-400. This criminal forgery 
was completely unforeseeable to Guardian; under Gray v. Scott, 
Guardian owed no legal duty to protect plaintiff against it. 
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D. Plaintiff Fails to Demonstrate Why Guardian 
Should have Foreseen That Plaintiff Would be the 
Victim of a Forgery. 
1. The Court Should Not Consider Plaintiff's 
Arguments, Which She Failed to Make Below. 
On appeal, plaintiff advances two arguments why 
Guardian, in this case, was under a duty to foresee and protect 
plaintiff against the forgery. As a threshold matter, Guardian 
notes that these arguments were not made to the trial court. 
Instead, plaintiff simply dismissed Guardian's argument that it 
had no duty to protect plaintiff from the forgery as 
"irrelevant." R. at 440. Therefore, its arguments should not 
be considered for the first time on this appeal. Bundy v. 
Century Equipment Co., 692 P.2d 754, 758 (Utah 1984); Franklin 
Financial v. New Empire Development Company, 659 P.2d 1040, 
1045 (Utah 1983) . 
Even if her arguments had been made below, they are 
nonetheless without merit. 
2. Guardian's Role as Fiduciary Does Not 
Require It to Protect Plaintiff From the 
Unforeseeable. 
Plaintiff first argues that this case is 
distinguishable from Gray v. Scott because Gray "pertain[s] to 
third-party relations, or relations to strangers, not to 
relationships involving fiduciaries." Appellant's Brief, 
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p. 23. Plaintiff fails to explain, however, why Guardian's 
role as a fiduciary to plaintiff should make any difference. 
Whether Guardian's duty is fiduciary in nature, or simply a 
non-fiduciary duty of every man to protect others from 
unreasonable risks of harm, the critical issue must still be 
whether the particular harm is foreseeable. 
The unequivocal holding in Gray is that one has no 
duty to protect another from criminal conduct. This is because 
such conduct is unforeseeable as a matter of law. Plaintiff 
has pointed to no reason, nor is there any, why one should have 
a duty to protect another from the unforeseeable merely because 
they have a fiduciary relationship. Plainly, all one can be 
expected to do is protect others against risks reasonably to be 
foreseen. No one, not even fiduciaries, should be required to 
guard against the unforeseeable. 
Plaintiff also argues that Gray v. Scott, and the 
cases following the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 448, are 
inapplicable here because unlike those cases, here "the forgery 
preceded the [alleged] negligence of Guardian. . . . " 
Appellant's Brief, p. 24. 
Plaintiff correctly identifies a factual distinction 
between this case and Gray v. Scott. In Gray v. Scott and the 
other cases following Section 448 of the Restatement, the 
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defendant acts first, and a crime is committed later, resulting 
in harm to the plaintiff. Here, by contrast, the forgery was 
committed first, and Guardian acted later, on the assumption 
that the forgery was authentic. 
The existence of a duty to anticipate that a crime 
will be committed should not depend, however, on whether it is 
a crime committed after the defendant acts or, as in this case, 
a forgery which is committed before-hand. Forgery is a crime 
which, by its nature, is designed to induce action or reliance 
that of necessity will take place later in time. As such, a 
forgery which occurs before the defendant acts is equally 
unforeseeable to the defendant as a crime that might be 
committed afterwards. It is a crime of deception which, done 
properly, cannot be detected. One cannot reasonably 
"anticipate", within the meaning of Gray v. Scott, that a 
document relied upon is a forgery. 
The sound policy underlying both Gray v. Scott and 
Section 448 is that one should not be held accountable for 
events which cannot reasonably be anticipated. The 
unforeseeable or unanticipatable event may take place before or 
after the defendant acts, but the timing is truly irrelevant to 
whether the particular act should have been foreseen. 
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Plaintiff offers no reason why this factual distinction should 
make a difference. 
In sum, Guardian submits that this court's prior 
holding in Gray v. Scott controls this case. Here, as there, 
Guardian had no duty to anticipate that a crime would be 
committed, and to act upon that belief to protect plaintiff. 
V. PLAINTIFF'S -POLICY- ARGUMENTS DO NOT JUSTIFY 
REVERSAL OF THE TRIAL COURT'S JUDGMENT. 
Plaintiff sets forth, at Points VI and VII at the end 
of her Brief, several miscellaneous arguments why the trial 
court's judgment should be reversed. Of these arguments, only 
one, relating to the trustee's "exclusive control," Appellant's 
Brief, p.28, was raised below. See R. at 445. The other 
arguments should not, therefore, be considered on appeal. 
Without addressing the merits of plaintiff's lone 
argument which was set forth below, it is painfully evident 
that it cannot possibly justify reversal of the trial court's 
judgment, and a conclusion that Guardian is liable to plaintiff 
as a matter of law. 
CONCLUSION 
Without citing the court to any evidence that Guardian 
acted improperly, and without citing any legal precedent to 
show that Guardian was required to take greater care than it 
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did before reconveying, plaintiff asks the court to reverse the 
decision of the trial court, and hold Guardian liable as a 
matter of law. 
The relief sought is clearly unjustified. First, 
Guardian owed no duty to protect plaintiff from the 
consequences of the alleged forgery, a deliberate criminal 
act. Even assuming such a duty was owed in the first place, 
Guardian satisfied that duty as a matter of law by acting in 
good faith reliance on an acknowledged document. 
Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court 
dismissing plaintiff's Complaint against Guardian Title Company 
of Utah and Warren EL Curlis should be affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 17th day of October 1986. 
JONES, ^ L D O , HOLBRO^^i MCDONOUGH 
-2D" By_i 
id R.(Mone Dav R.G o y 
George W. Pratt 
Attorneys for Guardian Title 
Company of Utah and Warren H. 
Curlis 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
BETTE WYCALIS, ] 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CITY FEDERAL SAVINGS AND 
LOAN ASSOCIATION, et al., ] 
Defendant. I 
i MEMORANDUM DECISION 
i Case No. 88766 
After considering defendants Guardian Title Company and 
Warren H. Curlis1 motion for summary judgment and reviewing the 
affidavits and memoranda presented by both plaintiff and 
defendantsf the Court rules as follows: 
The Court finds that, based upon the statement of both 
parties, there are no material disputed facts. 
Defendants, Guardian Title and Warren H. Curlis, as 
trustee, executed a deed of reconveyance after receiving an 
acknowledged request (purportedly from plaintiff) stating that 
the debt had been paid and that the property could be reconveyed. 
The acknowledged request was a forged document, the debt had not 
been paid, and plaintiff was divested of her security interest. 
Plaintiff argues that defendant was negligent in not contacting 
plaintiff prior to the reconveyance to confirm that the debt had 
in fact been paid. 
ADDENDUM I 
(i) 
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Memorandum Decision 
Case No. 88766 
The issue is whether a trustee is entitled to rely on a 
written, acknowledged request stating that the debt has been paid 
and requesting that the property be reconveyed or whether the 
trustee has a duty to take further steps to confirm that the debt 
has in fact been satisfied prior to the reconveyance. 
Defendant argues and gives authority for the position 
that he had no duty to foresee the criminal acts of another and 
was entitled to rely on an acknowledged document. Defendant's 
authorities suggest thatf under Utah law and Rules of Evidence, 
acknowledged documents are accorded great weight to the extent 
that they may be relied upon by judges and juries as presump-
tively authentic. 
Plaintiff argues that defendant was negligent in failing 
to know or take steps to know that the debt had, prior to recon-
veyance, been paid. Plaintiff gives authority for the position 
that a trustee will be liable when property is reconveyed without 
authorization. Apparently, none of plaintiff's cases deal with 
the issue of whether or not a trustee is negligent in relying 
solely on an acknowledged request. 
The Court finds that Utah cases and Rules of Evidence, 
which give great weight to acknowledged documents, compel a 
ruling that, in a case such as this, a trustee is not negligent 
in relying on an acknowledged request to reconvey property unless 
the trustee has reason to believe the request is forged. No 
(ii) 
Page 3 
Memorandum Decision 
Case No. 88766 
evidence has been presented to suggest that the trustee should 
have been suspicious of the document; therefore, defendants1 
motion for summary judgment is granted. 
DATED this 2( day of October, 1985. 
DAVID E. ROTH, Jud^e 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this & ' day of October, 1985, 
a true and correct copy of the foregoing Memorandum Decision was 
served upon the following: 
Sherman C. Young 
IVIE & YOUNG 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
P. 0. Box 672 
Provo, Utah 84602 
George W. Pratt 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & MC DONOUGH 
Attorneys for Defendant Guardian Title 
170 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Joseph Hatch 
Attorney at Law 
311 South State #320 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Eric Hartman 
Attorney at Law 
2120 South 1300 East 
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utafr\ 84106 
PAULA CARR, Secretary 
(iii) 
INSTALLMENT PROMISSORY NuTE 
s 6JU8.QJU&Q l ^ Z . l „ „ 19 . . ? ! 
For value received, I, we, or either of us, promise to pay to the order of A?.TX?...^X.?^kT..?....^.?.^ 
EVA ROBERTSON 
at .. ..3Q .SLNpr t h . .4.0.0. J a s t ^ . . .Payjon / M MUtah _ t the sum of 
SIXTY-ONE THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED AND NO/100 DOLLARS 
together with interest on the unpaid balance thereof from date at the rate of jk?.™.* percent per 
annum, in lawful money of the United States, in monthly installments of t 7 5.6.52 each on the 
....It?J: day of each and every month beginning with the ....„?.?:. day of ...._.?.^rL.7 
19 ...8.0..., and continuing until the whole thereof shall have been fully paid. 
The makers, sureties, guarantors and endorsers of this note jointly and severally agree that if any installment is not 
paid when due, that the whole of the principal sum then remaining unpaid, together with the accrued interest thereon 
shall forthwith become due and payable at the option of the holder of this note, and that beginning with the date of such 
default the whole of said unpaid principal shall bear interest at the rate of #K percent per annum both, before and 
after judgment. 1 0 . 5 
The makers, sureties, guarantors and endorsers hereof severally consent to renewals and extensions at or after ma-
turity hereof and waive presentment for payment, notice of dishonor, protest and notice thereof, and agree to pay a 
reasonable attorney's fee, together with all costs and expenses incurred© in the event that this note is placed in the 
v hands of any attorney for collection. R & C / A S S O C I A T E S , 
Address .. 
Ito^^&£^iXIer,general partner 
Address ...95A..waXden..iii.lls...D.E.iy.e..,. 2. -^^f^^J^^& 
S L C , UTAH .- ^ V / ^ y - ^ 2 _ 
Address P . . 0 ^ BQX 5 Q 2 3. XDy u^tr*~&f dr^S^^^t: 
Price, Utah 84501 n?™* i $ rC£r 
Address 4. .jLl^lQj 
D E B K A ST-This note and the interest thereon is secured by i^econcTTrust Deed aated June 26, 1980 
on property located in Weber County..UtajL. 
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WHEN RECORDED, MAIL TO: 
BOOK 1361 nee 7Qx 814? r 
QU 
ItUTV :±* 
»EPF: 
>uH 
JUL 15 1125 AH'60 
Space Above for Recorder^ La* ~ - - w n^ £D - > 
SECOND 
Crust JBecb 
THIS TRUST DEED is made this 26th day of June 
between R & C ASSOCIATES, a general partnership 
whose address is 
(Street and Number) 
GUARDIAN TITLE COMPANY OF UTAH 
BETTE WYCALIS and EVA ROBERTSON 
Bountiful 
(City) 
PLATTED ~ vr?,r:ro JO 
ENTERED G MICROFILMED Q 
,19 80 
, as Trustor, 
Utah 
(State) 
, as Trustee,* and 
, as Beneficiary. 
Trustor hereby CONVEYS AND WARRANTS TO TRUSTEE IN TRUST, WITH POWER 
OF SALE, the following described property situated in Weber County, Utah: 
Beginning at a point which lies South 0o28'07" West 949.73 feet 
and North 89°31,16M East 50.01 feet of the Northwest Corner of 
the Southwest Quarter of Section 12, Township 5 North, Range 2 
West of the Salt Lake Base and Meridian; thence North 89°33'00M 
East 247.36 feet to the Weber-Davis Canal; thence South 21°03,35M 
West along said canal 106.85 feet; thence South 89o33,00" West 
209.78 feet to the East Riqht-of-Way line of 1900 West Street; 
thence North 0°28,07" East along said Riqht-of-Way line 99.42 
feet to the point of beginning. 
Together with all buildings, fixtures and improvements thereon and all water rights, rights of way, 
easements, rents, issues, profits, income, tenements, hereditaments, privileges and appurtenances 
thereunto now or hereafter used or enjoyed with said property, or any part thereof; 
FOR THE PURPOSE OF SECURING payment of the indebtedness evidenced by a promissory 
note of even date herewith, in the principal sum of $ 61 ,800.00 , payable to the order of 
Beneficiary at the times, in the manner and with interest as therein set forth, and payment of any 
sums expended or advanced by Beneficiary to protect the security hereof. 
Trustor agrees to pay all taxes and assessments on the above property, to pay all charges and 
assessments on water or water stock used on or with said property, not to commit waste, to maintain 
adequate fire insurance on improvements on said property, to pay all costs and expenses of collec-
tion (including Trustee's and attorney's fees in event of default in payment of the indebtedness se-
cured hereby) and to pay reasonable Trustee's fees for any of the services performed by Trustee 
hereunder, including a reconveyance hereof. 
The undersigned Trustor requests that a copy of any notice of default and of any notice of sale 
hereunder be mailed to him at the address hereinbefore set forth. 
..R..$...C.AS^IAJKJ..^ 
.BY, K^^,...r^M... 
Roy L. roller general partner 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF Salt Lake 
On the 26th day of June , 19 80
 t personally appeared before me 
ROY L. MILLER who being duly sworn did say that he is a general partner of R & C 
ASSOCIATES, a general partnership and that said instrument was sioned in behalf of 
said partnership by authority, and said ROY L. MILLER acknowledged to me that he as 
such general partner executed the same in the name of the partnership. 
Notary Public 
My Commission Expires: June 28, 1981 Residing at: Kaysville, Utah 
•NOTE: Trustee roust be a member of the Utah State Bar; a bank, building and loan association or savings and 
loan association authorized to do such business in Utah, a corporation authorized to do a trust business in 
Utah; or a title insurance or abstract company authorized to do such business in Utah. 
FORM 141-TRUST DEED, SHORT FORM— «*u.Y CO • • w NINTH SOUTH S L t . UTAH 
ADDEND.UM I I I V SJ> rYz 
REQUEST TOR FULL RECnNVfYANCt 
TO: GUARDIAN TITLE COMPANY OF UTAH (Trustee) 
The undersigned is the legal owner and hclder of the Note and all other 
indebtedness secured by the Trust Deed dated t^c 26th day of June 
19_80 , recorded the 15th day o f _ J u 2 L - _ ~ ^ f e ^ . - ' l9—~ u' BoG'; 
I3bl , Page 7bi recores o* £^raxiaxxixx»tx% utan, Said 
Note, together wTth all otner indebtedness secured by said Trust Deed has been 
fully paid and satisfied, and you are hereby requested and directed, or. payment 
to you af any sums owing to you under the terms of said Trust Deed, to cancel 
said Note above mentioned, and all other evidences of indebtedness secured 
by said Trust Deed delivered to you herewith, together with the said Trust Deed 
and to reconvey, without warranty to the parties designated by tne terms of said 
Trust Deed, all the estate now held by you thereunder in and to the property 
decribed as follows: 
Beginning at a point which lies South 0°28,07M West 949.73 feet and North 
89°31,16" East 50.01 feet of the Northwest Corner of the Southwest Quarter 
of Section 12, Township 5 North, Range 2 West of the Salt Lake Base and Meridian; 
thence North 89o33,00u East 247.36 feet to the Weber-Davis Canal; thence South 
21°03,35u West along said canal 106.85 feet; thence South 89o33'00" West 209.78 
feet to the East Right-of-Way line of 1900 West Street; thence North 0°28,07" 
East along said Right-of-Way line 99.42 feet to the point of beginning. 
Dated December 18, 1980 
State of Utah } 
)s$ 
County of ) 
On the 22 day of December 19 80 , personally 
appeared before me BLUE WYCALIS 7J^~EVyTOBERTS0W-
the signers of the within instrument who duly 
acknowledged to me that they executed the same. 
t_&7n&z4g 
Notary Public 
My Commission Expires: q-\~$\ Residing in: ftarraY , U**h 
ADDENDUM IV 
(vi ) 
Space above for Recorder's Use 
JVcb nf Jlramimjimcc 
(Corporate Trustee) 
GUARDIAN TITLE COMPANY OF UTAH 
under a Trust Deed dated June 25 , , 19 BO 
R & C ASSOCIATES, a general partnership 
and recorded July 15, , 19 80 , as Entry No. 814866 
, as Trustee 
, executed by 
, as Trustor, 
in Book 1361 , 
Page(s) 761 of the records of the County Recorder of Weber County. Utah, 
pursuant to a written request of the Beneficiary thereunder, does hereby reconvey, without warranty, 
to the person or persons entitled thereto, the trust property now held by it as Trustee under said 
Trust Deed, which Trust Dead covers real property situated in Weber 
Utah, described as follows: 
County, 
BEGINNING at a point which l ies South 0°28*07n West 949.73 feet and North 
e9°31,16" East 50.01 feet of the Northwest Corner of the Southwest Quarter 
of Section 12, Township 5 North, Range 2 West of the Salt Lake Base and 
Meridian; thence North 89°33'00" East 247.36 feet to the Weber-Davis Canal; 
thence South 21°03'35" West along said canal 106.85 feet; thence South 89° 
33*00" West 209.78 feet to the'East Right of Way line of 1900 West Street 
thence North 0°28,0714 East along said Right of Way line 99.42 feet to the 
point of beginning. 
Dated this 26 th day of December ,19 80 
QUARPI^..JITLE^ 
Bv Ms'O-^——^V * GU^'U 
WARREN H".' OMAS'Tresideni 
Trustee 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF Salt Lake 
On the 26 th day of December 
WARREN H. CURLIS 
PRESIDENT 
, 19 80 , personally appeared before me 
, who being by me duly sworn, did say that he is the 
of GUARDIAN TITLE COMPANY OF UTAH 
a corporation, and that said instrument was signed in behalf of said corporation by authority of it* 
by-laws (or by a resolution of its board of directors) and said WARREN H . CURLIS 
J 
acknowledged to me that said corporation executed the same. / i 
I 
My Commission Expires: 6-28-81 
^^,Z..:<^.l./S,....L.i,..„^... 
^ > ' ' Notary Public 
Residing at: Kaysvi l ie , Utah 
ADDENDUM V 
( v i i ) 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 17th day of October, 
1986, I caused four (4) copies of the foregoing Brief of 
Respondents Guardian Title Company of Utah and Warren H. Curlis 
in Case No. 860172 to be mailed, postage prepaid to: 
Dallas H. Young, Jr. 
Sherman C. Young 
IVIE AND YOUNG 
48 North University 
Provo, Utah 84603 
Joseph E, Hatch 
GARRETT AND STURDY 
311 South State, Suite 320 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Eric P. Hartman 
SAMUEL KING & ASSOCIATES 
2120 South 1300 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
^ 
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